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The forces that drive the Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled China since 1949, after prevailing in a bloody civil war against the National People’s Party (Kuomintang). The CCP’s coming to power followed a period of social upheaval upon the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. In place of power manifesting itself in one ruler, China today is ruled by a unified party.

The realisation of the goals of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan will be important to the Chinese Communist Party and it remains to be seen whether the reforms and, with them, the lifeline of the party, can 
be sustained. 
PHOTO: REUTERS

The realisation of the goals of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan will be important to the Chinese Communist Party and it remains to be seen whether the reforms and, with them, the lifeline of the party, can
be sustained.
PHOTO: REUTERS

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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled China since 1949, after prevailing in a bloody civil war against the National People’s Party (Kuomintang). The CCP’s coming to power followed a period of social upheaval upon the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. In place of power manifesting itself in one ruler, China today is ruled by a unified party.

Since the undertaking of market reforms in 1978, China’s economy has taken on a form that critics pointed out as being capitalist in substance, but which the CCP maintains is “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.

The CCP has 80 million members in almost four million grassroots organisation. It adopts a pyramid-like hierarchical structure. Its network is expansive yet tightly knitted and its influence permeates all important organisations and institutions. Its power is made complete by the inter-locking of the country’s three organs of command and control — namely, the party, the government and the military.

The CCP practises social democratic centralism. Personnel are selected for appointments, not elected. Entry to the party is contingent on the endorsement of existing party members.

PRESERVING POWER

The CCP recognises that the support of the masses is critical for its survival. President Xi Jinping, in his maiden speech as the new party chief in 2012, said: “Our strength comes from the people and masses.”

The adoption of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan in 2011 also marked the party’s change in emphasis on a “higher-quality and inclusive growth”, setting a lower annual gross domestic product growth target of 7 per cent and focussing instead on creating an environment for sustainable growth.

This includes setting priorities in equitable wealth distribution by developing rural and inland regions, promoting environment protection by curtailing pollution and developing clean energy, as well as promoting a sustainable economy via continued innovation and increased domestic consumption. Mr Xi has also signalled a change by advocating the greater use of the market system in China.

The realisation of the goals of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan will be important to the party. It remains to be seen whether the reforms and, with them, the lifeline of the CCP, can be sustained.

Mr Xi has made fighting corruption a key feature of his regime, pursuing corrupt “tigers and flies” — senior and junior officials. Critics have expressed doubts on whether the move is motivated by a desire for a clean government or a way for Mr Xi to consolidate his power. Nevertheless, since announcing a crackdown on corruption, there has been an about 20 per cent increase in major corruption cases prosecuted.

Between January and November last year, there were close to 22,000 major corruption cases handled by China’s prosecutors, of which 16,000 cases that resulted in public losses were dealt with and 23,000 officials punished. Close to 13,000 of these cases were considered major and important, involving more than 5.5 billion yuan (S$1.1 billion).

DRIVING FORCES

Fulfilling China’s destiny as a great nation is intuitively held as the duty of all Chinese and the supreme goal of the CCP. Within this visceral belief lies a deeper core conception. The leadership may not have all its future moves figured out, but it is adamant that it will keep the political structure in place. This is not only out of self-interest, but also because of a genuine belief that the party and its emphasis on central authority are essential for China’s success.

The concept of a strong central authority is held together by a binding belief of the party in its own righteousness. Today, the notion of party and not communism is the prevailing ideology and its tops leaders, a form of collective emperorship. The slogan of “if the Party succeeds, China will succeed” captures the inextricability of the two ideas in the minds of those in power.

Second, the party’s legitimacy is tied to the success of its long-term reform programme. Mr Xi himself acknowledged that “the more developed China is, the more open it will be”. The challenge will be how to marry an open economy with a closed political system. To this end, it will continue to follow Deng Xiaoping’s axiom of “crossing a river by feeling the stones”.

Third, China is committed to protecting its sovereignty and playing a role in global affairs. Until recent times, it has been content to follow Mr Deng’s advice to “bide its time, hide its brightness”.

However, internationally there is growing concern over China’s assertiveness. Beijing’s unilateral demarcation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), covering the bulk of East China Sea, the release of a 350-page “blue book” by the semi-official Chinese think-tank last year recommending that China be more proactive in the Indian Ocean region, and recent skirmishes between the Chinese and Japanese over the waters of Senkaku Islands are obvious examples of a new-found confidence in the Chinese leadership’s handling of international affairs.

Nevertheless, the Chinese are pragmatists. It exports more than US$160 billion (S$200 billion) worth of goods to Japan last year, making it Japan’s number one trading partner. It also exports more than a sixth of its goods to the United States, its largest export market. Hence, the increased economic linkages between China and its neighbours should serve to ensure a calmer sea, though there may be missteps arising from tactical miscalculations that could potentially erupt into geopolitical turmoil.

PAST IS PROLOGUE

Fourth, as Shakespeare wrote in the Tempest, “past is prologue”. China’s present and future are best understood from the perspective of its past. However, tellingly — as in the Tempest — there will be storms ahead. China’s past is also a narrative of volatility underpinned by consistencies. This quixotic mix will continue to be China’s fate.

China will continue to be a source of fascination, but it is not for the risk-adverse or for those who want a “surprise-free” experience. For those who dare and who can live with its internal contradictions, it could still be a land of opportunity, but it will certainly remain a land of adventure.

Most important are two initial conditions — first, is the willingness to understand China on its own terms and second, the ability to be patient. For the foreseeable future, China is not going away — it is the rest of the world that has to learn to deal with it. China is a rising tide, but as the Chinese saying goes, “water can float a boat, but can also sink it”.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Devadas Krishnadas is chief executive officer of Singapore-based Future-Moves Group, which provides consultancy and executive education on strategy and risk. He is also the author of Sensing Singapore: Reflections in a Time of Change.

This is the second of a three-part series on Understanding China. To read the first part, visit http://tdy.sg/comchina9may.

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