How US, Beijing can avoid conflict over South China Sea

When a United States Navy P8-A surveillance aircraft recently flew near Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, it was warned eight times by the Chinese Navy to leave the area.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: “China’s determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity is as firm as a rock.” US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter replied: “There should be no mistake about this — the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows us, as we do all around the world.”

So, is a Washington-Beijing conflict in the South China Sea imminent? In 1995, when I was serving in the Pentagon, Beijing began building structures on Mischief Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines and lies much closer to its shores than to China’s.

The US issued a statement that it took no position on the competing claims by five states over the 750 or so rocks, atolls, islets, cays and reefs that make up the Spratlys, which cover a vast area — 425,000 sq km — of the South China Sea. America urged the parties involved to settle the disputes peacefully, but took a strong stand that the South China Sea, which includes important maritime lanes for oil shipments from the Middle East and container ships from Europe, and over which military and commercial aircraft routinely fly, is subject to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty.

To back up its territorial claim, Beijing relies on a map inherited from the Nationalist period, the so-called “nine-dash line”, which extends nearly a thousand miles south of mainland China and sometimes as close as 60 to 80km from the coastline of states such as Vietnam and the Philippines. All of these states claim the 370km exclusive economic zones granted under UNCLOS.

WHY U.S. CHANGED APPROACH

When the dispute over Mischief Reef erupted, Chinese officials failed to clarify the meaning of the nine-dash line but, when pressed, agreed that the dashes demarcate areas where China has sovereign claims.

At the same time, they agreed that the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake and that it is governed by the UN treaty. On this basis, Washington and Beijing avoided conflict over the issue for nearly two decades.

However, China has not avoided conflicts with its maritime neighbours. Although it pledged to adhere to a code of conduct negotiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2002, it has used its superior military might in disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam.

In 2012, Chinese patrol vessels chased Philippine fishing boats away from Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast. The government of the South-east Asian nation has taken the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which China claims has no jurisdiction.

Last year, after China stationed an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam, ships from the two countries engaged in ramming and water-cannon battles at sea and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam followed. The region’s smaller states sought American support.

However, the US remained careful not to be drawn into the competing claims over sovereignty, some of which are tenuous, while on others, China sometimes has a stronger legal position. Moreover, America had to focus on larger issues in its relationship with China.

This began to change when Beijing initiated an active policy of dredging sand to fill in reefs and build islands in at least five locations. Earlier this year, analysts released images of what is expected to be a 3km runway on Fiery Cross Reef.

The US argues that UNCLOS grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 22km territorial limit, while China claims military flights cannot cross its 370km economic zone without its permission.

If Beijing claimed such a zone for each of the sites it occupies, it could close off most of the South China Sea. As an American official put it, China seems to be trying to “create facts on the ground” — what Admiral Harry Harris, US commander in the Pacific, has called a new “great wall of sand”.

China correctly declared that it was within its sovereign rights to dredge and that it was merely following the lead of its neighbours, whose governments had also been creating structures to bolster their claims.

However, America’s suspicions were heightened by the fact that in 2013, in a separate dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, the Chinese government unilaterally declared an Air Defence Identification Zone without prior warning.

The US response was to fly two B-52 bombers through the unrecognised zone. This set a precedent for the recent naval reconnaissance flight (which had a team of CNN reporters on board). America’s response was designed to prevent Beijing from creating a fait accompli that could close off large parts of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the original policy of not becoming embroiled in the sovereignty dispute continues to make sense.

The irony is that the US Senate’s failure to ratify UNCLOS means America cannot take China to ITLOS over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that may interfere with the right of free passage — a major US interest.

But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the US respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dash line and preservation of freedom of the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a US-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be avoided. PROJECT SYNDICATE

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard University, was formerly a United States assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs.