Closing ranks against the Islamic State

Sarinah at Thamrin, Indonesia’s oldest shopping plaza in Jakarta, is just next to a Starbucks cafe — a popular meeting place for yuppies, expatriates and others — which became the target of an audacious suicide bomb-and-gun assault by militants on Jan 14. Indonesian supporters of the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility, with the police linking them to an emergent loose alliance of nine cells called the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).

Immediate public reaction, however, showed that the brazen attacks only succeeded to alienate IS from Jakarta’s population. Shocked Indonesians took to social media to show defiance with hashtags such as #KamiTidakTakut” (WeAreNotAfraid). The same week, a local public opinion poll showed that 95 per cent of those interviewed nationwide rejected IS and its methods.

Unprecedented in scope and tactics, the attacks took terrorist violence in Indonesia to a new level. Before this, the modus operandi was largely by suicide bombings: The 2002 Bali bomb blasts, the 2004 car bomb outside the Australian Embassy, the 2005 triple bombs in Bali and the 2009 twin bomb attacks at JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels.

This time, it was a combination of suicide bombings and gunfire — a simultaneous, coordinated and multi-targeted assault, reportedly involving even a bike-mounted offensive. Perhaps this was the “konser” (concert) the militants had referred to in a coded threat.

Four attackers were killed while six more who were directly involved were arrested in subsequent police raids. In terms of body count, the attacks were, however, seen as a failure. But it has also exposed Jakarta’s vulnerability to urban terrorist assault a la Mumbai and Paris.

Officials close to the palace told me the attackers were second-liners after the first team had been neutralised following pre-emptive police strikes before Christmas and New Year’s Day.

“We were lucky that the second team was amateurish,” says Mr Atmadji Sumarkidjo, special assistant to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs.

The green light for the attacks was apparently given by Aman Abdurrahman, the jailed spiritual leader of JAD, also known as Jamaah Ansharut Khalifah Daulah Nusantara (JAKDN). Aman gave directions through Bahrun Naim, whom the police alleged was the mastermind of the Thamrin assault. One of the dead militants, Suhakim (or “Afif”), had visited Aman in jail for “blessings”.

Bahrun Naim, believed to be in Syria, has a bigger ambition of setting up an IS “province” in South-east Asia, covering not just Indonesia but also the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. According to a well-placed source, Bahrun Naim had also set his sights on a possible attack in Singapore.

“For him, Singapore is like a prize to be won,” says this source.

Indonesian national police chief Badrodin Haiti says the pro-IS network has a core of four Indonesian leaders — Bahrumsyah, Bahrun Naim, Salim Mubarok At-Tamimi or Abu Jandal, and their amir (leader) and ideologue Aman Abdurrahman. The Syria-based Bahrumsyah allegedly funded the attacks by sending back 1 billion rupiah (S$103,000). A fifth member linked to Aman is Santoso, regarded as Indonesia’s most wanted militant who is believed to be hiding in the jungles of Poso in Central Sulawesi.

JAKDN was formed in March last year, comprising supporters of IS from South-east Asia for the Syrian front. According to the police chief, JAKDN brings together nine hitherto disparate groups — essentially amounting to a loose network of IS-inspired cells.

Media reports say JAD/JAKDN’s adviser is convicted radical spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir, but this has been denied by Bashir’s lawyers.

The Thamrin attacks have jolted Indonesia’s political elite into unprecedented cohesion and action.

JAKARTA’S THREE-PRONGED RESPONSE

Within days, the government of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and the fractious legislative branch closed ranks to reform the currently weak anti-terror law by giving it effective preventive powers. The legislative changes look set to be passed soon, notwithstanding whimpers of concern by some groups over possible abuse. This is the first significant change.

The second big move forthcoming is the closer coordination of three domestic intelligence bodies and the creation of a fourth — Badan Siber Nasional (National Cyber Agency). The three existing ones are the national intelligence agency Badan Inteligen Nasional, the military intelligence unit Badan Intelijen Strategis, and the police’s counterterrorism arm Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme.

The third response, directly relevant to Indonesia’s neighbours, is closer cooperation and coordination between Jakarta and the regional intelligence agencies, as alluded to by the Coordinating Minister while in Singapore this week.

Backed by the United States, Indonesia has secured the support of Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, with Thailand’s decision still pending. Overarching this will be closer personal links and communication that Jakarta wants to forge among the region’s top leadership, given their common and growing threat from IS and its affiliates.

The effectiveness of Indonesia’s counter response to the Thamrin assault ultimately depends on the leadership of Mr Widodo, currently hampered by his limited political base despite his popularity. He needs to win over the hostile Parliament to push through reforms of the anti-terrorism law.

His political battle to strengthen his minority government seems to be succeeding as more parties from that bloc have either crossed over or plan to do so following his wooing. The game-changer will be the Golkar party, which is now patching up a major split between two rival factions. Over the weekend, the faction led by Mr Aburizal Bakrie hinted of repositioning Golkar as a government supporter — without leaving the non-governing coalition.

The political ground is moving towards a stronger Jokowi government in the face of a growing threat from IS. This will have implications for Indonesia’s neighbours as well. What President Jokowi needs now is the full support of the Muslim community. He has a head start as the two biggest Islamic movements, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, may be behind him.

Yet another game-changer could emerge should both groups break new ground by jointly leading the mainstream counternarrative that IS, fundamentally, is antithetical to Islam.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This first appeared in RSIS Commentary.