Indonesia’s days of pseudo-military leaders are not over yet

Last week, I wrote about the growing rivalry between the Indonesian military (TNI) and the national police in jostling for political clout and how TNI chief General Gatot Nurmantyo dared bypass President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to suspend military cooperation with Australia over allegedly insulting material to the state ideology Pancasila.

There was yet more to come from Gen Nurmantyo, which tells us something about the role of the military in Indonesia. Following the awkward debacle of suspended military cooperation with Australia, in another maverick moment, Gen Nurmantyo told the press he might soon be replaced as TNI chief. He hinted that he had somehow fallen out of favour but explained that, at any rate, he was nearing retirement.

He then made an “expose” about how little power the TNI chief had in the procurement of military hardware under a 2015 law that grants the Ministry of Defence sole responsibility for such acquisitions. Ruing his loss of control over procurement, he said: “If this (erosion of the TNI chief’s prerogatives) continues, then the commander will have no authority whatsoever.”

The new law must have come as a great disappointment to the armed forces, just when they were expecting significant rises in defence spending. In the 2017 state budget, defence is one of the 10 biggest spenders at 104.4 trillion rupiah (S$10.9 billion), compared with the 72.4 trillion rupiah allocated to the national police. The figures are expected to increase as the President has made a promise to jack up defence spending to around 250 trillion rupiah a year.

The figures must have been music to the generals’ ears, since defence procurement in the past was an area in which the top brass of the military could make significant economic gains through “commission fees” from defence contractors as well as other “markups”. By relocating the procurement responsibility to the Ministry of Defence, the government effectively closed off significant “economic access” previously enjoyed by military grandees.

In airing his disappointment, Gen Nurmantyo was perhaps being true to his brash indiscreet self — a side Mr Widodo had evidently missed, or underestimated, when considering him for the top job. However, the general’s penchant for talking to the press and delivering incendiary lectures — in one of which he described feeding hypothetical Chinese refugees to the sharks — may also suggest that he is trying to craft a careful image of himself as an all-action patriot ready to embark on great things.

Judging by former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s political success story, former army generals with popular appeal can still do well electorally. It is also noteworthy that Gen Nurmantyo’s unbosoming to the press came after the police scored an important political triumph in shoring up the President’s authority during the populist Islamist rallies in November and December last year. The rallies, purportedly against Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama — a Christian of Chinese descent who is accused of blasphemy — were on the verge of turning into protests against the government and, ultimately, the President.

With a turnout of hundreds of thousands, the Islamist protests represented the first real challenge to Mr Widodo’s presidency. To blunt the blow, the police duly arrested several “agitators” on treason charges on the morning of last year’s Dec 2 rally. National police chief Gen Tito Karnavian, handpicked by Mr Widodo in July last year, threw his weight behind the President and proved to be in his element by being seen to contain the possible excesses of the rallies through a combination of negotiations and strong-arm tactics.

In contrast, the armed forces did not seem overly eager to come to the President’s aid during the turbulent months. Instead, Gen Nurmantyo expounded on his pet theory to the press, arguing that radicalism and “pitting Indonesians against one another”, as evident in the gubernatorial election campaign, was another proxy war designed by foreign powers.

More seriously, Gen Nurmantyo is said to have strong links to hardline Muslim groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front, which served as the field operators for the recent Islamist rallies against the government.

Seasoned Indonesia correspondent John McBeth considers the allegation to have some merit. He quoted a retired general in an article, writing: “Playing games with Muslim groups is a result of a rotting situation … They want to show that the army is still needed and they have no concerns about the problems it creates.”

If true, then Gen Karnavian, with the President’s blessing, deftly turned the tables on the army cabal wishing to create an untenable situation, which would have necessitated military intervention. Far from humiliating the police for their inability to control the masses, it allowed them to swoop in and save the day for the President.

The triumph of the police in securing the President’s gratitude took place at the expense of the military. Yet, this temporary political setback for the military does not mean the end of rivalry between the forces. The police, being the most involved with civilians, inevitably have the advantage over the TNI in post-Reformasi Indonesia.

However, in their interaction with the people lies the police’s weakness. A 2015 survey by Transparency International, for instance, placed the police as one of the most corrupt government agencies as perceived by the public. Apart from taking and demanding bribes, police officers are also known to operate strictly illegal “businesses” on the sidelines, such as “security money” demanded from businesses and individual officers commandeering lucrative urban “parking spaces” in conjunction with gangsters, or preman.

Now that the President is indebted to the police, it remains to be seen if Mr Widodo can push through further reform within the force to combat rampant corruption. Failure to do so might just provide the military with another avenue to power. The President certainly has his work cut out for him in balancing between the forces.

The spectre of the armed forces’ tentacles in Indonesian politics is real enough to warrant vigilance, although the country’s democracy has fared better than its Thai counterpart in this respect. The dwifungsi doctrine implemented by former President Suharto’s military-dominated “New Order” government in Indonesia to justify greater influence of the TNI may have been formally abolished, but its roots are buried deep.

Corny as it may sound, a military uniform tends to inspire confidence in the country, so much so that former President Sukarno, who never had military training, spent the last years of his life wearing his military honours in the most conspicuous manner.

If Gen Nurmantyo truly has political aspirations after he retires, and provided he can secure enough political backing, we may see him compete in the 2019 presidential election, alongside Mr Prabowo Subianto and perhaps Dr Yudhoyono’s son, Mr Agus Harimurti. Indonesia’s days of pseudo-military leaders are not over yet. Not by a long way. THE JAKARTA GLOBE

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Johannes Nugroho is a businessman and writer from Surabaya.