What drives people to join extremist groups?

Militant groups such as the Islamic State (IS) can offer direction and a certain meaning in life that some people crave, said Professor Andrew Silke from the University of East London, where he is programme director for Terrorism Studies. Prof Silke, who serves as a counterterrorism consultant to government agencies in Britain and America, is in Singapore to give a lecture at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. In this interview with TODAY, he examines the appeal of IS and suggests ways to deal with returning fighters.

What is the draw of the Islamic State? In particular, why does it appeal to young people even from developed countries?

The appeal is based on a range of factors. For some, it is a sense of adventure and excitement. For others, it provides a strong sense of identity and belonging. To the people attracted, IS can offer a powerful sense that you are doing something meaningful and that you matter. The reality, of course, when people get there can be much harsher and very different. But for young people looking for meaning and direction in their lives, IS can appear to offer answers and certainty.

There have been many instances of young women in their teens being radicalised by the Islamic State and travelling to the conflict areas for marriage. What drives them?

The Islamic State offers clarity, certainty and a clear sense of belonging and meaning. That can be very, very attractive to young people, who are often searching for a clear sense of identity and a quest for significance and acceptance. In its propaganda, IS offers all these and more.

What is the typical psychological state of a jihadist who has returned after fighting? Is it euphoria and a sense of accomplishment or emptiness as the “mission” has ended?

Most are tired and have no intention of trying to continue the conflict elsewhere. Probably fewer than 10 per cent have a serious interest in further violence. Some are disillusioned by their experiences. The conflict was not the noble, heroic adventure they expected. The group they were fighting for also failed to live up to expectations. Some suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and other problems as a result of what they have seen or done. Many are anxious about their future and what will happen if they are identified by the authorities as a returning fighter.

How should countries rehabilitate jihadist returnees? How do we strike a balance between the carrot (counselling, making them feel less marginalised) and the stick (stronger legislation to “punish” them)?

This is a very tough question and one that the United Kingdom, for example, is really struggling with today. About 600 UK citizens have travelled to fight with the Islamic State. Many have already returned and some of those have been imprisoned. Others have tried to travel and have been stopped and imprisoned too.

I think we need a balanced approach. We should offer a route out for people who have changed their minds and are desperate to leave IS. Some people remain in Syria mainly because they think they will be imprisoned if they try to return home. There are disengagement and counter-radicalisation programmes these people can do which can help them leave without having to face years in prison. But we also need to recognise that there will be highly radicalised individuals who are extremely committed to the IS cause, and prison is a legitimate and sensible option for them.

From the macro policy perspective, what are the most vital measures governments should take to prevent the radicalisation of individuals?

First, I think we need to accept that you cannot have a society that is completely free of extremism and if your focus is to try to eliminate all extremism, you are setting yourself up for failure. Only totalitarian regimes can have such ambitions and who would want to live in that type of society?

Second, we need to be careful about claiming radicalisation is the result of one factor. The UK government, for example, is pushing the view that extreme ideology is the primary cause of radicalisation. It is convenient to blame ideology because the role of other factors such as discrimination, marginalisation and foreign policy get pushed to the side.

The counterterrorism effort starts to focus increasingly on only countering the ideology and expecting that that will be the solution.

Research shows us that a range of factors drives radicalisation and that identity issues, for example, are more important than ideology in explaining how and why young people become radicalised.