Questions raised over navigation of ships in busy waterways following US naval collision

SINGAPORE — The collision involving the destroyer USS John S McCain and a commerical vessel, the second such accident involving an American warship in two months, has raised questions on how ships navigate busy waterways safely.

Mr Kirk Patterson, a former dean of the Japan campus of Temple University who has crossed the Pacific in a sailboat and circumnavigated Japan, said that an oil tanker hitting a destroyer would be like the collision of an “F1 sports car and a garbage truck”.

“Which one is going to be able to avoid the collision?” he said. “An F1 racing car equipped with state-of-the-art missiles.”

The collision between McCain and Alnic MC, a 600-foot vessel that transports oil and chemicals, followed another collision in June between destroyer USS Fitzgerald and a freighter off Japan, killing seven US sailors.

Traversing crowded bodies of water is like going on a superhighway at sea — not too difficult on a calm, clear day, but often harrowing in bad weather.

Ships often do not stay in designated traffic separation zones. Many merchant ships light up their decks at night to ward off local pirates, but the bright lights can also dangerously obscure the vision of officers on approaching ships.

As such, there are well-established rules for vessels navigating these waterways, such as a mandatory reporting system for vessels over a certain size.

In addition, all ships are equipped with navigational safety equipment, and naval ships are likely to have even better and more high-tech systems.

Commercial vessels must have an Automatic Identification System (AIS), which connects to satellites for vessel tracking and displays the location of other ships.

However, navy vessels often fail to turn on these AIS systems, which can create problems for commercial shipping when their military counterparts use busy waterways, according to Ms Claudia Norrgren, an associate director of VesselsValue, which provides data about shipping.

Naval vessels have also been known to turn off their radar to remain undetected in stealth operations, though experts TODAY spoke to discount the possibility that this was the case for the USS McCain in Singapore Strait, adding that it is not normal practice for a warship’s radar to be switched off during routine operations.

The US Navy ship was at the time making its way to Singapore for a routine visit.

“A warship would turn off its sensors only when it is in a ‘tactical’ situation.” said Dr Collin Koh, a naval analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies."For normal peacetime transits, especially through waters with dense traffic, it'll have its navigation radar on."

Mr Ridzwan Rahmat, who is with defence consultancy Jane’s by IHS Markit, noted that, while a warship would shut down its combat sensors such as its fire-control and air-search radars during transit or when calling into port, its navigation radar would typically be active.

“This is to ensure the ship’s safety, especially while it is moving in a crowded waterway like the Strait of Singapore,” he added.

A destroyer going through a difficult passage like the Strait of Malacca would typically have half a dozen sailors, including two officers, on the bridge watching for the lights of other ships, said retired United States Navy Captain Bernard D Cole, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and professor emeritus at the National War College.

For navigational safety, there are also extra sailors assigned as lookouts and others are added below decks to help in case of steering or engine problems. A ship’s commanding officer, navigator, or executive officer is often on the bridge during the traversal. Navigation teams routinely hold briefings before entering narrow waters to go over safety issues. Radar operators and combat information officers also track ships.

When an oil tanker is detected, Captain Cole said, the officer on deck or the commanding officer will propose some kind of evasive action to avoid a collision. But “in some places like the approaches to the Malacca Strait, geographically you don’t have a lot of flexibility”.

Ships travelling into the Singapore Strait or out to the South China Sea travel in separate lanes. A “traffic separation zone” dividing the two can only be entered in emergencies.

They are required to sail at 12 nautical miles per hour — less than half the typical speed of a merchant vessel — in the narrow straits. The waters open up only past Port Klang, neighbouring Malaysia’s main gateway to the sea.

“This is what we call the funnel effect. The place is very congested,” said Mr Tan Hua Chiow, a retired Singapore naval officer of 22 years.

“While ships have sophisticated equipment, the men on watch are the most important. Ships that leave the area tend to speed up,” he added.

Around 2,000 merchant ships travel in the area every day, Mr Tan estimated. A typical merchant ship’s radar can detect obstacles 20 nautical miles (36 km) away.

While large ships like the Alnic MC receive signals from their radar, they take a longer time to react, he said.

Some vessels sail on autopilot in open waters. While there is “no definite rule” preventing ships from using autopilot in narrow channels, shipping vessels typically avoid using it in such circumstances, said Raj T, a marine superintendent of a private shipping firm who declined to give his full name. He has been in the industry for 40 years.

“It is one of the procedures in a narrow strait to put the ship on hand steering, so that action can be taken quickly,” he said.

Capt Harry Bolton, director of marine programmes at California State University Maritime Academy in Vallejo, noted that officers on commercial ships undergo frequent training exercises with an emphasis on collision avoidance.

Officer training and electronic systems have helped yield a sharp improvement in shipping safety around the globe. According to a shipping safety report this year by Allianz, the German insurance giant, there were 17 commercial vessels sunk in collisions as recently as 2007; last year, there was only one, a smaller vessel.

The US Navy’s series of collisions this year, at a time of steadily improving overall shipping safety, suggests that the Navy may need to do more training of the officers on its bridges, Capt Bolton said.

“That’s a lack of what we call bridge-team management,” he said. “It’s fixable: They bring the same kind of training that we get.” AGENCIES, WITH ADDITIONAL REPORTING BY BEN HO