Why M’sia is adopting a tougher S China Sea stance

“Pushback” is a word rarely, if ever, used by Malaysian leaders in connection with China’s increasingly unnerving actions in the South China Sea. Yet this was the word of choice by Malaysia’s Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein in a press interview last week in Kuala Lumpur following a keynote address to the Malaysian Defence Staff College.

Mr Hishammuddin remarked that “if the reports that (the Malaysian Ministry of Defence has) received from various sources regarding the build-up and placement of military assets (by Beijing) in the Spratlys are true, this forces us into a pushback against China”.

The defence minister also disclosed efforts to meet and hold talks with his Australian, Philippines and Vietnamese counterparts to discuss China’s ongoing activities that appear to militarise the South China Sea.

The change of tone is notable, considering Mr Hishammuddin glossed over questions on China’s frequent patrols around James Shoal in August 2013 by stating that the Chinese “can patrol every day, but if their intention is not to go to war it is less of a concern”.

What motivated Mr Hishammuddin to adopt a harder stance against creeping Chinese assertiveness?

First, Mr Hishammuddin’s remarks caught many off guard, since Malaysian senior ministers are usually more circumspect in criticising China. While the very public insinuation of the looming Chinese threat was surprising, the sentiments that animate the threat were not.

In fact, the Malaysian security establishment has been concerned over Chinese actions in the South China Sea for some time. Intrusions by Chinese vessels into Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have been the norm rather than the exception.

Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Shahidan Kassim, who also oversees the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), reported to the Senate in March 2014 that the MMEA had “increased their operational presence at South Luconia Shoals (located 84 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak) from 269 sailing days in 2014 to 345 sailing days in 2015”. He also informed the Senators that China had deployed a coast guard ship in the vicinity of the South Luconia Shoals for the past two years.

To be sure, China’s brazen actions in the South China Sea have not gone down well with the Malaysian security establishment, casting a shadow over Sino-Malaysian ties.

Second, the effects of Chinese actions are not confined to the diplomatic-legal-security realm. The domestic political ramifications of Chinese intrusions are making it increasingly hard for Kuala Lumpur to turn a blind eye. Chinese coast guard ships, for example, use intimidation tactics to drive away Malaysian fishing vessels from the South Luconia Shoals, depriving the local community of their livelihood.

Mr Jamali Basri, chairman of the Miri Fishermen Association, lamented that as a result of China’s gunboat diplomacy, “only fishing boats from China could fish in the area”.

Just last December, a group of 20 representatives from the Sarawak Association for People’s Aspiration held a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate in Kuching. Against greater political awareness on the issue, the federal government cannot afford to be seen as indifferent to the plight of Sarawakians with the state elections scheduled on April 30.

NOT ENTIRELY ANTI-CHINA YET

In the near term, the South China Sea will continue to feature in the local politics of Sabah and Sarawak, as it will be a test case of Putrajaya’s regard for East Malaysia. The ruling Barisan Nasional will not want to be fielding questions on the federal government’s subversion of the local interest in favour of the Sino-Malaysian relations, given the large block of federal parliament seats allocated to East Malaysia. Thus, Putrajaya would not want to be seen as “weak” on the South China Sea issue.

Third, Malaysia may be coming out of its “hedging” shell. Being nice to China has not accrued Malaysia any positive outcomes on the South China Sea. In fact, evidence on the ground suggests that patience on the part of Malaysia only seems to encourage greater intransigence from China.

“Pushback” could thus be interpreted as a recourse to regain the initiative and send a clear and unequivocal message to China that Malaysia will stand its ground to protect its interests in the disputed region.

Under Mr Hishammuddin’s watch, the Defence Ministry has announced the establishment of a new naval base in Bintulu, Sarawak and a marine corps — both measures to firm up Malaysia’s capability to protect its sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These measures are, at this point, more of a statement of intent given Malaysia’s current fiscal position.

However, they should be read in the larger context of Malaysia’s willingness to stand up to China.Mr Hishammuddin is not alone in the brave new world of speaking frankly and openly on the South China Sea issue.

In November 2015, Deputy Prime Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, noted that “a regional superpower has encroached into (Malaysia’s) maritime territory by constructing airstrips, jetties and other facilities on three atolls just 155km from Sabah”. He further raised a rhetorical question of whether “this made sense when that country’s mainland is more than 3,000km away”, before declaring that “Malaysia would not remain silent as the superpower concerned had encroached into the country’s EEZ”.

To be sure, Malaysia has not crossed into the “anti-China” camp, nor would it ever want to do so. China is Malaysia’s largest trade partner and there is much to lose on both sides if the booming two-way trade unravels. However, Malaysia is taking a hard look and asking the tough question of trading off its political and strategic interests against economic benefits. The “pushback” approach tellingly points to the growing importance of the former.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Tang Siew Mun is Senior Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.