Skip to main content

Advertisement

Advertisement

Crimea offers US lessons on how to handle Asia tensions

China’s new aircraft carrier may have pride of place in the country’s growing fleet, but it is actually a refitted hull that once belonged to Ukraine. Before he became the first foreigner to board the Liaoning, United States Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel used a trip to Asia last week to draw a much broader connection between Crimea and China’s maritime ambitions.

China’s new aircraft carrier may have pride of place in the country’s growing fleet, but it is actually a refitted hull that once belonged to Ukraine. Before he became the first foreigner to board the Liaoning, United States Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel used a trip to Asia last week to draw a much broader connection between Crimea and China’s maritime ambitions.

“You cannot go around and redefine boundaries, violate territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations by force, coercion and intimidation — whether it’s in small islands in the Pacific or large nations in Europe,” he told an audience in Tokyo. “So I want to talk to our Chinese friends about this.”

The implications of the Ukraine crisis will be felt well beyond Europe. One of the most important side-effects will be the lessons China draws, and whether it concludes that the status quo in Asia can be brushed aside without consequence.

Asia combines the most sophisticated manufacturing networks of the 21st century global economy with strong hints of the late 19th century: Surging nationalism, growing navies and toxic territorial disputes. Across the region, there is concern Russia’s latest exercise in redrawing borders will embolden China to push its own island claims. Mr Hagel has spent his week trying to address those fears.

On one level, it might seem a stretch to draw too close a link between Ukraine and Asia’s maritime disputes. Crimea presented a unique set of circumstances for an opportunistic leader to exploit. By virtue of its naval base in Sevastopol, Russia already had forces pre-positioned in Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin was helped by political instability in Kiev and genuine popular support in Crimea.

Most of all, the basic geography of the region meant that the US and Europeans had no realistic military option when Russia made its move on Crimea.

However, if China were to try to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, it would meet a stiff response from Japan and probably the US. America has no alliance with Ukraine — but it does with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

But, in the eyes of many of its neighbours, China has for a number of years been conducting mini land-grabs in the region’s seas. In 2012, Chinese ships in effect assumed control of Scarborough Shoal, a chain of reefs and rocks in the South China Sea, after a confrontation with the Philippines. In recent weeks, Chinese ships have also been trying to edge the Philippines out of another area called Second Thomas Shoal.

NEW REALITIES

In both Asia and Europe the US faces the same dilemma: The fact that it ultimately cares less about the outcome than either Russia or China, for whom the stakes are higher.

With all this in mind, there are several broad lessons from Ukraine for the US in Asia. The first is to stay the course in the region. With some justification, critics accuse the administration of enabling Mr Putin by neglecting Europe. But the Ukraine crisis actually makes the case for the Asia “pivot” — the idea that deterrence can best be achieved by maintaining a strong military presence, boosting alliances and deepening economic links with Asia, while also trying to engage China.

However, the Crimea crisis also shows the importance of picking the right battles. It is one thing to defend traditional allies. But just as the West should not have been so surprised that Russia was terrified of losing influence in Ukraine, the US will need to tread carefully as its boosts ties with countries such as Vietnam if it wants to avoid provoking China.

Ultimately, the crisis has been a wake-up call to the harsher new realities of international politics. Mr John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, is fond of slamming Russia’s “19th-century behaviour” in Ukraine. However, in a world of aspiring great powers such as China and frustrated “regional powers”, as US President Barack Obama refers to Russia, economic ties and international law may not be enough to prevent destabilising revisionism. Globalisation has not restrained Russia. THE FINANCIAL TIMES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Geoff Dyer covers United States foreign policy and is a former Beijing bureau chief for The Financial Times.

Read more of the latest in

Advertisement

Advertisement

Stay in the know. Anytime. Anywhere.

Subscribe to get daily news updates, insights and must reads delivered straight to your inbox.

By clicking subscribe, I agree for my personal data to be used to send me TODAY newsletters, promotional offers and for research and analysis.