N Korea’s dangerous nuclear gambit

In August, a flash flood in parts of North Korea bordering China wiped out entire villages, killing hundreds of people. The disaster saw thousands of soldiers mobilised and working with bare hands, while North Korea’s top leader Kim Jong-un was nowhere to be seen.

Instead, he strives to project an image of strength. On Sept 9, he was in a bunker directing the North’s fifth, and so far the most powerful, underground nuclear test, on the 71st anniversary of the regime’s founding. The North launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Oct 15 and again on Oct 20 during United States–South Korean security consultations in Washington.

More than 25 missiles were launched towards Japan this year, and the Musudan rocket, with a range of 3,500km that could target US bases on Guam, is a favourite — sending a message that threats will not cease unless talks with the US resume. The missile exploded shortly after blastoff, marking another failure for the North’s continuing efforts at attaining long-range missile technology.

President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” — ignoring the nation until Mr Kim is ready to talk about denuclearisation — needles the regime. Mr Kim, who came to power in December 2011, is impatient to gain recognition as a nuclear state, apparently regarding this as a means to guarantee survival of his state and his own life. There is no indication that Mr Kim will stop, despite grinding poverty that has driven nearly 1,000 people to defect this year alone.

His adventurous course is snapping nerves in South Korea, where President Park Geun-hye has openly called for North Koreans to desert and take refuge in the South. Speaking at the Oct 1 Armed Forces Day ceremony, she departed from the usual cautious statements on the North by calling for North Koreans to resist their government. She declared that the South was keeping its doors open for their arrival. At the Oct 11 Cabinet session, Ms Park proposed building refugee centres capable of accommodating up to 100,000 people.

Other South Korean dignitaries called on China to help with regime collapse — or at least help change the “regime’s driver”, a clear reference to Mr Kim — to save the North from internal chaos.

Beijing is not likely to accept such a proposition. So, the US and South Korea are strengthening readiness against any chance of war. The two allies’ defence secretaries met on Oct 20 in Washington for an annual review of the North’s threat. They discussed how the US should provide “extended deterrence”, covering South Korea with a US nuclear umbrella in the event of an attack from the North. The rationale: The US will launch a preemptive strike in the event of any credible sign of a nuclear-tipped missile attack. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se urged the allies to use “all tools in the toolkit”, and US Secretary of State John Kerry wants Thaad, the high-altitude area defence anti-missile system, deployed to South Korea “as soon as possible”.

This follows other combat-readiness displays such as flights of B-1B strategic bombers over the skies close to the North, and submarine warfare exercises near the demarcation line.

South Korea’s intelligence chief advised a parliamentary session in mid-October that the North could conduct another nuclear test around the US presidential election on Nov 8, or the presidential inauguration on Jan 20 next year, to pressure Washington into coming to the negotiating table on its terms, including withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.

Mrs Hillary Clinton is likely to lead the next administration in Washington. Prospects of Mr Kim facing a better outlook remain slim. Statements by Mrs Clinton’s policy advisers suggest no alteration in their assessment of North Korean threats.

While most reject any scenario that assumes a preemptive strike on the North, as that could trigger full-scale war with huge casualties and damage for the South, they nevertheless reject soft-dealing with the North in terms of sanctions and isolation.

“I don’t think we could go back to the table without some very clear signals from the North that they are rejecting provocations and they are willing to at least implement their previous promises of constraining their nuclear arsenal,” Ms Michele Flournoy, former undersecretary of defence for President Obama, said in Seoul.

In short, the US will not waste time on talks unless Pyongyang signals readiness to give up its nuclear weapons. President Park agrees. “We now know that the North will never give up its nukes and missiles,” she said.

She has dispensed with her initial policy of inducing Pyongyang into a “trust-based” dialogue.

Ms Park senses that North Korean society is developing serious internal fissures under Mr Kim’s brutal rule. Hundreds of middle-ranking party members are said to have been purged since the 2013 execution of his uncle Jang Song-thaek.

Another indicator of growing alienation within the system: Increasing numbers of defectors from the North, so far up 28 per cent from last year.

Defectors include soldiers crawling through the mined demilitarised zone, and senior diplomats and trade officials in China, Russia and elsewhere deserting, sometimes with government money.

The most famous is Mr Thae Yong-ho, a European expert posted in London who defected in August with his family. He fled to the South after failing to carry out a mission to bribe British officials for confidential nuclear information.

WHAT PRICE TO CHINA?

Few experts expect large-scale defections to cause regime collapse. On top of brutal internal controls, the border with the South is heavily booby-trapped, while crossing into China has become more difficult since Mr Kim came to power. Especially challenging is how the regime keeps its populace in the dark about news of the outside world.

There are other roadblocks. Seoul’s relations with China, whose cooperation is vital for any political change for the North, have come under considerable strain: Seoul’s decision to accept deployment of the US high-altitude missile defence system to defend itself against the threat has provoked China into ceasing cooperation on United Nations Security Council sanctions.

China’s role in tightening sanctions on the North is kept at a minimal level, and the nation continues to provide oil to keep the regime functioning and buying coal.

“You can say that China is indirectly helping the North Korean nuclear programme by providing valuable foreign exchange,” said one expert who requested anonymity.

Beijing prosecutes Chinese violators of the sanctions regime only when confronted with evidence. Beijing reluctantly acted on the arrest of a Chinese businessperson in Dandong accused of contraband exports to Pyongyang, upon evidence produced by US agents.

China’s protective stance over North Korea and its evident refusal to constrain the North’s nuclear push have convinced Seoul and Washington to adopt a harder line outside the purview of Beijing’s influence. One notable result of this estrangement is Seoul’s growing cooperation with Tokyo on security and defence matters, despite acrimony over their shared history.

One concrete result of this new cooperative phase will be an agreement on the exchange of military intelligence, meaning closer security collaboration by the two major US allies regarding North Korean threats.

This follows an agreement on holding joint naval exercises with the US Seventh Fleet.

By playing a dangerous nuclear gambit within the uncertain milieu of his isolated regime, Mr Kim is unwittingly helping shape new geopolitical adjustments in the region that may not be necessarily beneficial to his leading patron, China.

China resists constraining the North — and in turn, that prompts new encirclement of China by an emerging security phalanx involving Japan, the US and South Korea. YALE GLOBAL

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Shim Jae Hoon is a journalist based in Seoul.