Revisionist powers are driving the world’s crises

The headlines have been dominated by regional crises — in Ukraine, Iraq and the South China Sea. But is there a common thread that ties together these apparently unconnected events?

One global theory is advanced by Professor Walter Russell Mead, a professor at Bard College, in a recent piece for Foreign Affairs, entitled The Return Of Geopolitics. Prof Mead’s piece, together with a rejoinder by Professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University, offers a way of thinking through current patterns in world politics.

Is global system under threat?

The shape of the world order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union is fairly easy to define. Its key characteristics included a globalised economic system, functioning multilateral institutions and — most important of all — an unchallenged role for the United States as the most powerful player.

The debate is about whether that system is now under threat. Prof Mead asserts that China, Russia and Iran never bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War and they are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn it.

The crisis in Ukraine, which was taking shape as Prof Mead wrote his article, provides a vivid illustration of his thesis. Russia’s anger with the post-1991 settlement has led it to formally annex Crimea. China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims and Iran’s obvious dissatisfaction with the regional order in the Middle East form the other pillars of the argument.

Prof Mead calls these three countries “revisionist powers” and argues that while “they haven’t overturned the post-Cold War settlement ... they have converted an uncontested status quo into a contested one”.

Prof Ikenberry responds that “Prof Mead’s alarmism is based on a colossal misreading of modern power realities”. As far as he is concerned, “China and Russia are not full-scale revisionist powers, but part-time spoilers at best”. The US, he points out, has “military partnerships with more than 60 countries, whereas Russia counts eight formal allies and China has only one (North Korea)”.

All told, the “military capabilities aggregated within this US-led alliance system outweigh anything that China or Russia might generate for decades to come”.

The US is also the beneficiary of favourable geography because it is “the only great power not surrounded by other great powers”. The US also promotes ideas with global appeal, while Russia and China “have no appealing brand”.

Above all, however, Prof Ikenberry believes the so-called “revisionist powers” are not really revisionists at all. They will not challenge the American-led world order because, ultimately, they benefit from it. He said: “Although they resent that the US stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment and technology from other societies.”

What is more, Russia and China are big powers with vetoes at the United Nations. Their interests are protected by the current system because “they are geopolitical insiders”.

So which of these two analyses is more convincing? I should declare an interest. Back in 2010, I published a book called Zero-Sum World that predicted increasing geopolitical competition between the West and the governments in Beijing and Moscow. It always seemed probable to me that a relative decline in American power would provoke challenges to the US-led world order.

So, naturally, I am sympathetic to Prof Mead’s arguments that current political developments do indeed demonstrate the failure of the West’s efforts to “shift international relations away from zero-sum issues towards win-win ones”.

CHINA’S NATIONALISTIC POSTURES

That said, the debate is hardly settled. The rise in tensions in Ukraine and in the seas around China seems to fit the zero-sum thesis neatly. But neither Russia nor China has yet made a definitive break with the US-dominated global system. If Russia fails to escalate the Ukrainian crisis, it could yet be argued that the Vladimir Putin government — faced with sanctions — decided that the costs of a full-scale confrontation with the West were too high.

Iran more obviously matches the profile of an outsider, revisionist power. On the other hand, the Iranian regime, impoverished by sanctions, seems to be trying to break its way back into the international system by seeking a deal over its nuclear programme.

Over the long run, China is surely the most important potential challenger. Unlike Russia, it is a rising power and, by some measures, now the world’s largest economy.

Beijing has not yet attempted anything as reckless as the seizure of Crimea. And China adopts a lower profile on global issues outside its region than Russia does. But a pattern of more assertive Chinese behaviour in disputes with its neighbours, including some American allies, is now obvious.

Whether China is truly seeking to remake the global order or simply to become more assertive, within the current framework, is a debate for the seminar room. What does seem clear is that China’s traditional emphasis on economic growth is now increasingly accompanied by more nationalistic postures on political and security issues. That, in turn, is leading to an increase in tensions with China’s neighbours and the US.

You can call that the “return of geopolitics” or the rise of a “zero-sum world”. But whatever the terminology, it looks like a dangerous trend that is gathering momentum.

THE FINANCIAL TIMES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Gideon Rachman is the Financial Times’ chief foreign affairs columnist.