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S China Sea: The beginning of Chinese rule?

With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that China’s controversial deployment of the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in disputed waters of the South China Sea in mid-2014 was a sideshow. During the ensuing diplomatic crisis between China and Vietnam, Beijing made its key move, pouring sand on at least six reefs under its control in the Spratlys to create new islands.

Dozens of Chinese dredgers, bulldozers and construction-related vessels have turned reefs into reclaimed land as China secures a stronger footing in the strategic waterways. Photo: Reuters

Dozens of Chinese dredgers, bulldozers and construction-related vessels have turned reefs into reclaimed land as China secures a stronger footing in the strategic waterways. Photo: Reuters

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With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that China’s controversial deployment of the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in disputed waters of the South China Sea in mid-2014 was a sideshow. During the ensuing diplomatic crisis between China and Vietnam, Beijing made its key move, pouring sand on at least six reefs under its control in the Spratlys to create new islands.

The oil rig was removed after two months, but dozens of Chinese dredgers, bulldozers and construction-related vessels have remained, turning reefs into reclaimed land as China secures a stronger footing in the strategic waterways also contested by countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia.

As recent satellite images show, China’s reclamation is extraordinary in terms of speed, reach and intensity. The new islands, averaging 2 sq km each, are being filled with airfields, ports and military installations, sparking fears of militarisation in the region.

Is it inevitable, then, that the South China Sea will turn into a “Chinese lake”?

By all accounts, the balance seems to be in China’s favour. The world’s second-largest economy has all the time in the world and is adopting a patient — yet hard-nosed — approach to dominate the waters and isles.

While all the claimant states, including China, do not fancy a military clash, Beijing’s actions have been less than cordial.

Its tactics include using “cold violence” — non-military use of force — to subdue smaller adversaries. Chinese Coast Guard ships have been ordered to ram into foreign vessels and fire high-pressure water cannons to push them around.

These acts of non-lethal violence gave a clue to the rationale behind China’s consistent efforts in building up a formidable fleet of white-painted law enforcement vessels and fishing ships along with its naval modernisation.

Though the Chinese navy has hardly used force around the reefs, it is always in the background as a deterrence and stands ready to intervene if shots are fired against Chinese boats. This combination of “cold violence” and “military deterrence” helps China assert ascendancy over its competitors in the South China Sea.

 

UNEASY TANGO

 

China is competing with the United States for big power status and is pushing hard to carve out its sphere of influence. Beijing’s determined expansions in the South China Sea, disregarding political and diplomatic costs, indicate that this area is a key theatre in Beijing’s strategy. After all, the South China Sea is not the strongest point of the US security system in the Asia-Pacific, but is strategically important as a major link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The Chinese manoeuvres have stirred strong US reactions and both sides have been trading barbs recently.

However, the Pentagon’s recent deployment of US warships and a surveillance aircraft carrying CNN reporters to the region could be construed as a hollow show of gunboat diplomacy that is not going to help halt China’s island-building.

During his visit to Beijing in May, US Secretary of State John Kerry met China’s top leaders to convey concerns about the reclamation and urge restraint. The Chinese, while polite, were unmoved.

President Xi Jinping replied that the US and China can share power in the Pacific, while Foreign Minister Wang Yi — at a press conference with Mr Kerry beside him — repeated that the Chinese resolve to safeguard its sovereignty is “firm as a rock”.

What is the end goal of this uneasy tango between these two superpowers? In the longer term, the US is moving 60 per cent of its naval force to the Pacific as part of President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to the region. However, it is still unclear how the US would help smaller claimants to deal with Chinese “cold violence” without escalating the situation. The fact that the US has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea weakens its moral ground to denounce China and enforce the power of international law.

These reactive and military-centric responses leave one to wonder if Washington does have a firm long-term commitment or an effective counterstrategy to cope with a sustained Chinese “tidal wave” in the South China Sea.

As for the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), serious doubts remain as to whether it can act as a check on the Chinese march.

If anything, the bloc has been reluctant to respond to China with anything more than a tap on the wrist. The recent statement of ASEAN leaders in Kuala Lumpur expressed concerns about the reclamations — but fell short of even mentioning China as the party responsible. To be fair, non-claimant members are reluctant to criticise Beijing or choose sides as they have close economic ties with China. Unfortunately, however, disunity in ASEAN is clearly the main obstacle to forging a common stance against China’s activities in the South China Sea.

China will no doubt continue to tighten its grip in the South China Sea. The new forward bases in the Spratlys, coupled with airfields, radar installations, refuelling stations and logistic centres, will provide China with capabilities to conduct long-distance, sustained and frequent patrols to enforce its own rules, such as its annual fishing ban, inspection of foreign ships for security concerns and possibly an air defence identification zone (ADIZ).

If this trend continues, the US risks losing its credibility as the security provider in the region. The individual South-east Asian claimants cannot match China’s naval might and daily encounters with Chinese forces at sea will result in fatigue. If nothing changes, the South China Sea could be the first crack in American primacy and the beginning of Pax Sinica in the Indo-Pacific.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Do Thanh Hai is a PhD candidate at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. The views expressed in the article are the author’s own.

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