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Under a more powerful Xi, China looks to flex its muscle on the global stage

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th party congress in October was a watershed event for Chinese politics, with the ruling party anointing President Xi Jinping as one of modern China’s greatest figures.

With President Xi now the most powerful Chinese leader in decades, he may yet gain more allies within the Communist Party, with critics careful about being on the wrong side of him. Photo: Reuters

With President Xi now the most powerful Chinese leader in decades, he may yet gain more allies within the Communist Party, with critics careful about being on the wrong side of him. Photo: Reuters

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The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th party congress in October was a watershed event for Chinese politics, with the ruling party anointing President Xi Jinping as one of modern China’s greatest figures.

Now that he has consolidated his position as China’s most powerful leader in decades after only five years in charge, what can we expect from Mr Xi and Beijing in the coming year? How will a stronger China affect its politics domestically and regionally?

TODAY’s EILEEN NG finds out more from four China experts: Professor Bo Zhiyue, director of Xipu Institution think-tank established by Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University in Suzhou, China; Assistant Professor Chong Ja Ian, who is with the National University of Singapore’s Political Science Department; Professor Steve Tsang, director of SOAS China Institute at the University of London and Mr Benjamin Ho, Associate Research Fellow at the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

 

Q: With Xi Jinping consolidating his power at home, what measures would he likely adopt domestically to push forward his vision of the Chinese Dream? Do you foresee an even tougher anti-graft crackdown? And what would be the likely reactions?

Prof Bo Zhiyue (BZY): I don’t think there are clear steps for him to follow in terms of promoting the vision of the Chinese Dream.

His vision is changing all the time — he has different priorities at different stages. For example in the first five years, he was focused on consolidating his authority through various means such as the sweeping anti-corruption campaign, promoting his associates and allies to ensure they are in good positions.

Now that he has consolidated his power, he is in the position to promote environment protection and the administration has rolled up numerous policies and laws related to it and there will be serious efforts in enforcing this.

He will also focus on innovation as the government has a five-year plan they set up in 2015 where innovation is a key theme for national development.

As to what would be the likely reactions to Xi’s increasing assertiveness domestically, I see it as bandwagon politics, meaning the stronger you get, the more allies you gain.

What’s the point of challenging (him) when the costs will be high, and the gains minimal?

When you get tough on your opponents, people will see that it is not good to challenge you and instead, they will lie low to avoid trouble.

Assistant Professor Chong Ja Ian (CJI): I suspect the tough domestic stance will continue.

Reworking the Chinese system is difficult as there will likely be opposition from vested interests.

Apart from the anti-graft crackdown, pressure on who the Xi leadership deems to be political threats — this includes dissidents and those who support through the legal system — is likely to continue.

Efforts to remove others who appear to stand in the way of Xi’s vision of progress, such as the most recent attempts to drive out urban poor and migrants from Beijing, will likely persist.

Currently, there seems to be few sources of organised resistance to Xi domestically, so he is likely to get his way.

The key variable is the Chinese economy, however. China needs to maintain GDP growth to keep employment up. However, the Chinese economy also faces the issue of heavy indebtedness and bad debts. Then there is the issue of property bubbles in various urban centres. These are potential sources of instability.

If serious economic problems arise, there may be more resistance to the Xi administration’s current policies, just as the Xi administration is likely to clamp down harder to maintain control.

Professor Steve Tsang (ST): The anti-corruption campaign will continue.

It is the trading name of a party rectification campaign, which Xi needs to ensure the Party will follow his orders and function effectively as a Leninist party.

The party is the instrument for delivering the vision. Still, Xi has not provided a roadmap to get to the promised land, just a declaration of what he will rely on to do so.

Benjamin Ho (BH): (I foresee) more control over the internet and cyberspace; greater government oversight over capital flows and (efforts to) ensure party members toe the line.

The anti-graft crackdown is part of a bigger contest for political power and to ensure that Xi’s power bases are not challenged by his opponents.

 

Q: Do you foresee a Mao Zedong-ish cult of personality developing around Xi Jinping? If so, what are the implications for the Communist Party?

BZY: There are signs of a personality cult developing around Xi but there is a very fine line between personality cult and strong personal leadership and it is hard for everyone to make it clear distinctively between the two.

But the CCP is aware of the differences and is trying to promote strong central leadership and the authority of one person, but at the same time, denying they are trying to promote the personality cult of Xi Jinping.

It is a sensitive balance with changing dynamics.

CJI: There is a lot of emphasis on Xi’s persona, including the recent introduction of Xi Jinping thought and its incorporation into the Chinese constitution. They concentrate and consolidate Xi’s hold on the CCP. However, the way that Xi’s prominence gets emphasised is more subtle than the type of personality cult that Mao developed around himself. The focus on Xi’s personality and leadership may mean that whoever succeeds Xi may not have the same level of authority.

That could be grounds for a power vacuum to develop.

ST: Not quite a Maoist cult but a personality cult is in the process of being promoted. Xi is not a Maoist totalitarian, but a Leninist strongman, one who relies on and uses the party to tighten control and deliver whatever changes he wants.

BH: (One implication is that) party members are afraid to speak out when real problems appear and instead guard their turfs more jealously, as they are paranoid of the repercussions of being on the wrong side of Xi.

This will be disastrous for China given the far more interconnected society with the world it is now compared to Mao’s time.

 

Q: What does a stronger Xi at home portend for Beijing’s foreign policy and concomitantly the region? Would the trend of Chinese military assertiveness continue or would it even increase?

BZY: From a Chinese perspective, a stronger leadership in China means a stronger China overseas. China is gradually filling the vacuum in Asia Pacific because of (US President Donald) Trump’s policies of looking inwards.

I also believe the Chinese military will get stronger because of reorganisation within it. Also, the military’s technological development will catch up (with the rest of the world) and in that sense, the Chinese military will get stronger and more capable.

CJI: A Xi Jinping leadership that is more secure domestically may be more willing to work its neighbours.

For instance, the consolidation of Xi’s position just before the 19th Party Congress seems to correlate with a softening of the PRC position on foreign policy, as seen in the invitation of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to China after a period of Singapore-China frictions and the easing of PRC economic pressure on South Korea over the latter’s Thaad deployment.

China seems to have gotten what it wanted on issues that may lead to friction with others. It has effectively a clear foothold in the South China Sea and other actors seem unwilling or unable to challenge this position effectively, whatever international law may say.

Beijing is in a position to block any developments relating to a South China Sea Code of Conduct it does not like.

Relations with Japan seems to have settled to some sort of mutual accommodation.

Conversely, it may be a Xi Jinping leadership that faces more domestic pressure and is unwilling to look weak that may drive a stronger Chinese foreign policy.

China does not have to do anything more militarily at this point other than to further enhance its capabilities.

What may be worth watching is how China may be seeking to influence societies and domestic politics in the region. Recent developments in Australia pertaining to Chinese influence may be at play elsewhere too.

This has the potential to reshape national positions and perhaps inject uncertainty in domestic politics in targeted places. This may be the smarter thing for Beijing to do rather than to rely on brute military muscle.

ST: Xi closed the chapter on the Deng period of ‘hiding capabilities and bidding for time’, and now asserts that China should take centre stage in global (including regional) affairs.

So, yes, China under Xi will be more assertive and will also be more muscular, particularly after the PLA’s reforms have bedded in and the capabilities of the PLA enhanced.

BH: China’s foreign policy is likely to be marked by greater insistence that its rights be respected by the region, and by the super powers.

Whether China’s military will be assertive depends on the CPC leadership’s priorities.

More likely, the Southeast Asia region will witness further China’s assertiveness, especially on the issue of Taiwan and the South China Sea disputes. But beyond the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese military not likely to have much interest in.

This is part of a series of commentaries looking at key issues that will come up on both the local and foreign fronts in 2018. Look out for upcoming commentaries on Singapore education, the jobs market here, US-China relations and political developments in Thailand.   

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