Understanding why Umno is leaning on Islam and PAS

In its general assembly earlier this month, the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) made clear that its near-term tactic is to double down on religion and a fledgling partnership with its former arch enemy, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).

Emphasising its relationship with PAS was politically expedient and understandable. Umno and PAS have the largest base of supporters among Malays. They are also the two largest parties in Malaysia. That said, it would be simplistic to suggest that the alliance between them will be without significant challenges.   

At its four-day party congress, Umno’s burgeoning pact with PAS, termed the Muafakat Nasional (National Consensus), featured extensively in the congress, with party leaders and delegates talking up its potential to return Umno to power.

Umno President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi announced that the first annual Muafakat Nasional Convention will be held before May 2020. This will likely formalise the relationship into an alliance.

Umno and PAS are hoping to get the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) on board as formal members of the alliance. The MIC has expressed its intention to do so. While the MCA is still lukewarm, it is in a position of weakness and will likely go with the alliance in time to come.        

At the general assembly, the Umno leadership tabled and passed roughly a dozen amendments to its constitution.

Significantly, Article 3 was re-written to state that Umno will “uphold the dignity and statute of Islam, race, and country”. For the last seven decades, the constitution stated “religion” rather than “Islam”.

This was indicative of Umno’s steadfast commitment to Malay, rather than Islamic, nationalism. With the constitutional amendment, Umno has made clear its sharp change in ideological priorities.

The constitutional amendment can also be seen as the culmination of Umno’s increasing reliance on Islamic politics since the late-1980s, when it began to compete with PAS for religious legitimacy. While it is still too early to tell whether Umno will transform from a Malay nationalist party into a quasi-Islamist one, its invigorated commitment to religiosity will likely be received well by most of the party’s membership and support base.  

Additionally, Umno’s objective of course is to assure PAS of its commitment to Islamic politics, even though it would lend credence to the notion that PAS has the upper hand in the alliance. Within Umno, the consensus is that the alliance is necessary for the party’s political survival.

This underscores how Umno has struggled without clear leadership since its electoral defeat. It is telling that to this day, the presence of Zahid and former prime minister Najib Razak stills looms large over the party, even though both are largely blamed for Umno’s electoral loss.

A handful of recent by-election victories has given Umno and the opposition Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition a slight boost. However, it is clear that Umno is still far from the force it used to be. The Tanjung Piai by-election result in particular has been attributed to voters’ frustration with the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government’s lacklustre performance.

While the agreement between Umno and PAS was brokered by senior leaders of both parties, the alliance will be shaky if is not translated downwards to the grassroots. And it is far from a given that this will happen.

Both parties’ grassroots machineries have long been at odds in Kedah and Terengganu. Even now, members of either party in these states do not see eye to eye. Similar difficulties could arise in Pahang, where PAS made significant inroads in the 2018 election.  

The competition for seat-selection for parliamentary constituencies will be pronounced at the state level. The prospect of Umno divisional leaders having to give up seats to PAS in these states will not sit well with them.

Cooperation between both parties could be easiest to achieve in areas where one of the parties is weak.

With some exceptions, Umno may generally be willing to concede to PAS in Kelantan. Similarly, PAS will defer to Umno in Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, and Johor.

Finally, Umno’s alliance with PAS will also hinge upon the political will and objectives of future Umno leaders. Currently, Zahid and his deputy, Mohamad Hassan, are behind Muafakat Nasional.

Yet, the consensus among Umno members is that Zahid is not likely to run for the party presidency beyond his current term.

His tenure will end in 2021. Other Umno leaders who may be gunning for the presidency in the party election, such as Khairy Jamaluddin, are cautious of the alliance with PAS.

Former Umno vice president Hishammuddin Hussein’s objectives would also be another factor to consider. While he has publicly embraced the alliance with PAS, he is seen to be at odds with Zahid.

Mr Hishammuddin is also expected to contest the presidency in 2021. The point is, it is not clear how the alliance may evolve or fragment post-Zahid.

Similarly, PAS deputy president Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man is known for being sceptical of Umno. If PAS president Hadi Awang steps down in the future, this too may throw a wrench into the Muafakat Nasional.

Clearly, then, the alliance between Umno and PAS still requires significant work.

While the Umno-PAS alliance could well unseat PH in the next election because of widespread frustration towards the latter, it is far from guaranteed that they will be cooperative partners.   

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman is an Assistant Professor with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. He is co-editor with Edmund Terence Gomez of Malaysia’s 14th General Election and Umno’s Fall: Intra-Elite Feuding in the Pursuit of Power. Prashant Waikar is a Senior Analyst with RSIS’ Malaysia Programme.