Malaysia’s two-faced Rohingya policy?

There exists a striking mismatch between how much Malaysian political actors profess sympathy for the Rohingyas, and how much assistance they are actually providing the Rohingyas with. While Malaysia has provided humanitarian aid for Rohingya refugees abroad – for which it should be commended – Rohingyas already living in Malaysia continue to suffer from multiple forms of institutional discrimination.

The inconsistencies in the government’s foreign and domestic policy towards the Rohingya are constitutive of a political strategy that seeks to inflate the government’s humanitarian credentials, particularly when the international media spotlight shines upon shines upon the latest round of violence in Rakhine State, while perpetuating a system of limited assistance for Rohingyas whom, by living in Malaysia, remain outside the international media’s line of sight.

The latest iteration of religio-political violence in Rakhine State erupted in late August.

But long before the current crisis, Rohingyas had been fleeing to Malaysia since the 1990s.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are approximately 56,000 registered Rohingya card holders but other non-governmental organisations have estimated a total of 200,000 Rohingya refugees are residing in Malaysia.

In recent years, Malaysian leaders have routinely spoken out on the treatment of Rohinyas by Myanmar, with Prime Minister Najib Razak even warning early this year that its persecution of Rohingya Mus-lims may fuel militants to radicalise the community.

Since the latest outbreak of violence more than a month ago, Mr Najib and other Malaysian leaders have even more been tremendously vocal on the issue – rightfully condemning the destruction of homes and villages, and the deaths and displacement of Rohingyas.

The unusually harsh criticism of the Myanmar government by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi at an Asean meeting in Manila last week is a case in point.

Clearly, such a stance by Malaysian leaders can be seen as aimed at its domestic audience and a crucial Malay-Muslim vote bank.

In the buildup to his trip to the United States, Mr Najib repeatedly promised to raise the plight of the Rohingyas to President Donald Trump. What more, in a speech shortly after his meeting with Mr Trump, Mr Najib vaguely claimed there now to be a “distinct possibility” Mr Trump would begin providing humanitarian aid to the Rohingyas, implying this potential development to be a product of their discussion.

However, while the joint statement referenced the violence in Rakhine, it did not at all even mention the word Rohingya. The ambiguous “civilian populations” was used instead.

It is unclear why Mr Najib, who claims to speak and stand for the Rohingyas, would be content with leaving the primary victims in Rakhine unnamed. After all, a joint statement with a superpower carries symbolic significance that considerably outweighs a statement with any other country. This was a diplomatic opportunity Mr Najib missed.

That said, it must also be noted that the Malaysian government has joined the international effort to provide tangible humanitarian aid to the Rohingya refugees living in Bangladeshi refugee camps. On Sept 9, Mr Najib inaugurated the humanitarian mission, Negaraku Prihatin (My Country is Concerned). Spearheaded by the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), Negaraku Prihatin sent 12 tonnes of food and aid, a group of volunteers, and a team to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a military hospital within the camp confines.

The symbolic significance of mobilising Malaysian military personnel to provide aid on the ground to the Rohingyas is notable. It is likely an attempt to ingrain the idea within the refugees that the MAF, and thus Malaysia, is a protective shield that can and will stand guard for them when they feel most vulnerable.

While Malaysia is by no means the largest provider of aid to the Rohingyas, credit to the Najib administration must be given where it is due. Credit should not, however, be overstated.

NO DOMESTIC INTEGRATION POLICY

Insofar as the Malaysian government has executed a humanitarian foreign policy that is ostensibly beneficial to Rohingya refugees, its treatment of those living within its borders leaves a lot to be desired. On the one hand, the Malaysian government regularly stages spectacles to proclaim its passionate concern for the Rohingyas. Mr Zahid’s allegedly unplanned fundraising effort for Rohingyas at Merdeka Rides 2017, an event for motor-biking enthusiasts in Putrajaya, is one such example. He spontaneously took off his cap, placed money inside it, and urged participants to do likewise.

Yet ironically, Rohingya refugees in Malaysia were denied the right to demonstrate against the Myanmar government outside its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Instead, the protest was labelled illegal, and over 40 refugees were detained.

The chairman of the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) – a government statutory body – criticised the protestors, saying they “should not have stretched” Malaysia’s sympathy for the Rohingyas. It was an astonishing response given that the Rohingya protest was directed at Myanmar, not the Malaysian government.

While the statement by Mr Razali Ismail does not reflect the government’s official position towards the Rohingya, it was striking that no Malaysian political or government leader came out to condemn it.

Instead, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Paul Low effectively legitimised the statement, pointing out that such protests could be construed as covert attempts to interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs – a reference to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference.

While this may be true, it is curious that the government does not consider the numerous events held by Malaysian leaders – Mr Najib himself has delivered multiple fiery speeches against Mynamar’s government – as violations of non-interference.

What more, Sungai Besar UMNO division chief, Jamal Mohamad Yunos even led a protest by marching to the Myanmar Embassy on Sep 8. Amidst proclamations of “long live Rohingya” and “long live Islam”, Mr Jamal called for the embassy to be closed down and for Myanmar nationals to be deported if violence against the Rohingyas did not cease.

Here, the government’s double standard is hard to deny. While the Rohingyas cannot possibly be allowed to protest the alleged persecution of their own, a government-sanctioned protest against the same entity can proceed unfettered.

In this context, it is difficult to locate the humanitarian dimension of Malaysia’s domestic policy towards the Rohingyas.

After all, even though Mr Najib continues to maintain that Malaysia will readily welcome more Rohingyas into the country, his administration has been unable to develop a policy that formalises their status as refugees and facilitates their integration into Malaysian society.

The failure to do suggests that the government is concerned more with guising itself as defenders of Muslims in peril, as opposed to pragmatic policy-making that provides the Rohingya with decent life chances in Malaysia.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

Prashant Waikar is a research analyst at the Malaysia Programme in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Chan Xin Ying is a research analyst with the Malaysia Programme at RSIS, NTU.