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How Singapore legitimises its presence in the Arctic Council

Singapore, despite joining the Arctic Council in 2013, has yet to publicly release an official policy, leading some other Arctic states to question what its interests truly are in the region. While China has labelled itself as a near-Arctic state and France has called itself a ‘polar nation’, Singapore is well aware that it is both an outsider and a relatively new player in the Arctic. As such, it treads carefully — it has often sought in various official speeches to articulate why the city state is interested in the Arctic and what it can contribute, rather than what its long-term strategy and goals are.

Some of the delegates attending the Arctic Council meeting in Juneau, Alaska in 2017 were able to visit the famed Mendenhall Glacier, less than 20 km from Juneau's city centre.

Some of the delegates attending the Arctic Council meeting in Juneau, Alaska in 2017 were able to visit the famed Mendenhall Glacier, less than 20 km from Juneau's city centre.

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Sixteen years after its admission into the Arctic Council, France published its official Arctic roadmap in 2016.

Japan released a ‘Basic Plan on Ocean Policy’ in 2013 highlighting its official Arctic initiatives, and it published a more comprehensive official Arctic policy paper in 2015.

In January 2018, China became the latest Arctic Council observer to release its policy.

But Singapore, despite joining the Arctic Council in 2013, has yet to publicly release an official policy, leading some other Arctic states to question what its interests truly are in the region.

While China has labelled itself as a near-Arctic state and France has called itself a ‘polar nation’, Singapore is well aware that it is both an outsider and a relatively new player in the Arctic.

As such, it treads carefully — it has often sought in various official speeches to articulate why the city state is interested in the Arctic and what it can contribute, rather than what its long-term strategy and goals are.

Singapore was active in the Arctic in the years leading up to its admission to the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013.

Such activities primarily occurred in its maritime industry, with the government-linked Keppel Corporation building its first two icebreakers in 2008 for Russian oil company Lukoil-Kaliningradmorneft.

But unlike some other Arctic Council member states, Singapore’s interest and involvement in the region has continued with increased vigour even after its admission.

Since 2013, Singapore has reiterated a two-pronged approach in the region: to assist in whatever way possible within the Arctic Council and the region itself, and to gain a better understanding of how changes in the Arctic may affect the island state.

On the first approach, Singapore has engaged extensively both within working groups (such as the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna group) as well as with the Council’s permanent participants via its Singapore Cooperation Programme (such as offering postgraduate scholarships for Arctic indigenous peoples to study in Singapore).

It has also co-organised offshoots of the region’s pre-eminent conferences such as Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers in the form of smaller, local forums.

Unlike China, Japan and South Korea, Singapore has exhibited a preference to work with Arctic states directly via both bilateral and multilateral engagements.

It has undertaken efforts to deepen its bilateral engagements not only with the NATO states in the Council but also with Russia.

On the second approach, Singapore is actively expanding several of its Arctic research programmes ranging from climate science to maritime law and engineering.

Aside from solely focussing on Arctic-specific issues, Singapore has also attempted to bridge sustainable energy solutions between the polar region and Southeast Asia.

The island city state does not presently have plans to articulate an official Arctic policy, though it has toyed with the idea of doing so.

Unlike its Asian counterparts, such as China and Japan, Singapore’s presence in the region is relatively nascent.

Captain Ashley Roach, who prepared an Arctic observer manual in 2017 catered to the city state, believes that while it is not entirely necessary for an observer to publish an official document on its Arctic strategies, it has become somewhat of an expectation given the proportion of observer states that have done so.

India is the only other Arctic Council observer in Asia that is yet to produce an official document articulating its policy in the region.

Other observers’ policies have not gone down smoothly.

China’s official policy aimed to allay suspicions of its intentions in the region, but the policy has not been entirely well received and in some ways has heightened existing trepidations about China’s Arctic involvement.

Captain Roach commented that China’s policy comes across as a ‘self-aggrandising effort’ that fails to put to rest China’s potential motives in the region by setting itself up as having more rights than other observers and perhaps as many rights as the littoral states.

Whether such an effort is actually China’s policy or more a manifestation of propaganda remains unknown, but such a criticism serves as an example of the potential ricocheting effect that an observer state’s policy paper can have.

Singapore, the only small island observer state in the Arctic Council, is unquestionably a unique entity within the Arctic sphere: it is approximately 140 times smaller than the smallest Arctic Council member state (Iceland) and is 7,000 kilometres away from the Arctic Circle.

But regardless of the strangeness of its presence in the Council, Singapore has constructed itself a reputation for upholding and advocating a robust international legal regime both within and without the Arctic context.

It has also managed to portray itself as a benign yet valuable member in its various forms of participation within the region as well as in playing a pivotal role in translating solutions between regions.

Singapore seems to believe that articulating an official policy paper is not the only way for a state to legitimise its position in the Arctic, and appears to prefer its actions and efforts at engagement to take precedence instead — at least for now. EAST ASIA FORUM

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Hema Nadarajah is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia.

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