Doctor acquitted of sexually assaulting patient suffers legal setback over related disciplinary hearing by SMC

SINGAPORE — A doctor who was acquitted in 2020 of sexually assaulting a patient has suffered a legal setback over a related disciplinary inquiry.

Dr Wee Teong Boo went to the Court of Appeal seeking to quash an order by a High Court judge that allowed the Singapore Medical Council (SMC) to use evidence from the criminal trial in the disciplinary inquiry.

Three judges — Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Justice Andrew Phang Boon Leong and Justice Belinda Ang Saw Ean — dismissed Dr Wee's application and ordered him to pay costs of S$50,000, including disbursements, to SMC.

The 72-year-old will also have to pay costs of S$9,000, including disbursements to the Attorney-General, who intervened in the matter.

THE CASE

Dr Wee was involved in a high-profile trial after he was accused of raping a 23-year-old patient in his clinic in 2015.

In 2019, he was sentenced to 10 years' jail after being found guilty of a charge of sexual assault by digital penetration and a second charge of outraging the patient's modesty.

He appealed against the conviction and was eventually acquitted by the apex court in June 2020, after it found many aspects of the patient’s testimony “incredible” or not persuasive.

In 2021, SMC then instituted disciplinary tribunal proceedings against Dr Wee on three charges of professional misconduct.

During the inquiry, SMC’s disciplinary tribunal admitted as evidence two statements he had given to the police during criminal investigations, as well as his own testimony at his criminal trial.

In February last year, Dr Wee filed a court challenge seeking to stop the tribunal from admitting the evidence.

Media reports stated in July last year that Dr Wee’s lawyers from Eugene Thuraisingam LLP argued that the police statements and testimony constitute hearsay evidence and cannot be used by SMC in the disciplinary proceedings.

High Court judge Dedar Singh Gill, who presided over the hearing, agreed that the statements and the testimony constituted hearsay evidence, but he ruled that the evidence was admissible.

He said then that under the Medical Registration Act, a disciplinary tribunal has the discretion to admit any evidence relevant to the proceedings, including hearsay evidence.

THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Tuesday’s appeal, held virtually, was against Justice Gill’s decision and it saw Dr Wee’s lawyer, Mr Eugene Thuraisingam of the eponymous law firm, verbally sparring with the judges over the definitions of three laws under the Criminal Procedure Code, which he sought to use to support his client's case. 

Dr Wee was not present during the hearing.

Referencing Section 22 of Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with a police officer’s power to examine witnesses, Mr Thuraisingam said it has a provision that allows a person being investigated to “not say things which may expose (him) to a criminal charge”.

Section 22 states that a person examined is bound to “state truly what the person knows of the facts and circumstances of the case, except that the person need not say anything that might expose the person to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture”.

Mr Thuraisingam then turned to Sections 258 and 259, both of which pertain to the admissibility of certain types of evidence.

He said that according to Section 258, the law expressly allows for an accused’s statements given to the police to be used at his criminal charge.

It does not, however, have any application “for things outside of a criminal trial”, he argued.

As for Section 259, it states that statements taken in accordance to Section 22 cannot be used except for certain exceptions, he added.

In the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 259 states that any statement made by a person other than the accused in the course of any investigation by any law enforcement agency is inadmissible in evidence, except where the statement is used for a criminal proceeding, among other exceptions.

On hearing this, Chief Justice Menon asked the lawyer if he contends that Section 259 controls Dr Wee’s situation, to which Mr Thuraisingam replied "yes".

Chief Justice Menon then said: “That can't be right because Section 259 concerns a statement taken from a person other than the accused.” 

He added that he “struggled to see how” the statements from Dr Wee could be said to be statements other than that of an accused.

“They were recorded from him while he was an accused person, and proceedings were brought against him,” he continued.

Mr Thuraisingam responded that Section 259 is applicable in the context of a criminal trial.

“When we are talking about civil proceedings or disciplinary proceedings, there is no accused person (as there is) in a criminal trial,” he said.

However, Chief Justice Menon countered by saying that “there's no way” that Mr Thuraisingam could say his client was a person other than the accused at the time the statements were taken.

“So (Section 259) cannot… on its terms, apply to cover your client because at the time the statements were taken, they were taken from your client who was the accused — not a person other than the accused.”

Mr Thuraisingam later said that based on the laws he mentioned, outside of a criminal trial, “nobody is an accused person”.

To this, Justice Phang said that this is “literally correct, but it is contextually wrong”.

The court also heard from Mr Thuraisingam that his client had been “robbed of his rights” against self-incrimination.

On the Singapore Legal Advice website, this statutory privilege Mr Thuraisingam was referring to means that in theory, one does not have to say anything to a police officer that tends to suggest that one is guilty of an offence.

“Dr Wee was investigated for rape, and he is entitled not to say anything which may incriminate him on the offence. Then you take the statement and use it for a quasi-criminal proceeding where the charge is different,” the lawyer added.

On this, Chief Justice Menon said: “But the point is, once he said things, you can’t invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to… avoid the consequences of things (he had) said.”

He added that all the privilege against self-incrimination allows for an individual to refuse to make incriminating statements.

“(Wee) wasn't forced to come and say all these things. He came and said all these things of his own accord.”

Eventually, Mr Thuraisingam said that he saw Chief Justice Menon’s point.